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INTOXICATION AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

D

RUNKENNESS is of exceptional theoretical importance for
the criminal law not only because it involves the basic postulates of liability, but also because it constitutes an essential feature
of numerous fact-situations whose impact on the rules has had
curious and instructive effects. A rare opportunity is thus presented to study the incidence of the bare abstractions of legally
embodied ethical principles in the actualities of administration.
The ambiguities that inevitably abound in such general principles
can be reduced in any study of their meanings in the specific contexts of the issues raised in connection with the penal responsibility
of inebriates. The need for such an analysis is indicated by the
paucity of extant studies, in marked contrast to the literature on
the law of insanity which is practically boundless. The reason cannot be the lesser social importance of the former, for although
mental disease is not an uncommon determinant of antisocial behavior, quantitatively it pales into insignificance by comparison
with the extent of intoxication.
One may well believe that traditional attitudes of hostility toward drunkenness ' render rational and just determinations more
difficult than in insanity cases. 2 The recent rise of a scientific literature on alcoholism makes re-examination of the traditional doctrines all the more important, indeed, imperative, for those who
sense the tragedy of unwitting harshness towards the weak, especially as it is revealed in this branch of the administration of the
penal law. For, although there has been much wise insight into
inebriety in the past, only within the last quarter of a century has
research been intensive and far-ranging. The veil has been drawn
sufficiently to stir profound and troublesome problems, questions
that challenge long-accepted standards and suggest that in this
broad field of human behavior where intoxication and serious harm
1 See People v. Townsend, 2i4 Mich. 267, 283 N. W. 177 (1921).
2

See East, Murder,From the Point of View of the Psychiatrist (1935) 3 MEDICO-

LEGAL & CRImiL. Rzv. 6i, 92.
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concur, the criminal law is an inefficient engine of severe and indiscriminate repression. In addition to reflection on the portentous
social implications of this challenge, the study of harms committed
by inebriates requires careful analysis of the relevant meanings of
traditional principles of culpability, and of the effect of the increased knowledge on their application by legal tribunals. The
central issues thus raised chiefly concern, on the one hand, the
courts' resistence to recent scientific discovery. On the other hand,
in the context of modern social theory, the problem involves the
positivist thesis that the difficulties can be eliminated and a correct
solution reached only by repudiation of the traditional principles
of responsibility. There are serious errors both in this thesis and
in the prevailing law.
COMMON LAW AND TIlE EXCULPATORY DOCTRINE

The early common law apparently made no concession whatever
because of intoxication, however gross,' although the contemporaneous records indicate mild treatment of insane homicides, 4 and
mediaeval canon law, though not without uncertainty, recommended indulgence to inebriate wrongdoers.5 The earliest English
report 6 is dated I 551, and it approves the death sentence for a

homicide committed in extreme intoxication. Such approbation is
typical of the era of the greatest severity in the entire history of
English criminal law rather than of the earlier law. An age which
gloried in the capital penalty for minor offenses would hardly be
impressed by the niceties of mediaeval ethical discrimination concerning inebriates. In any event, it is certain that from that time
to the early part of the nineteenth century, the rigorous rule prevailed, though it is not without significance that the efforts by Coke
and Blackstone to hold inebriety an aggravation met with no
success.
The reasons advanced in support of the rule that voluntary
3 See Singh, History of the Defense of Drunkenness in English Criminal Law
(1933) 49 L. Q. REV. 528, 530.
4 Ibid. In 133o a lunatic homicide was pardoned by the king. Fitz. Abr. No.
351, cited in id. at 530, n.9.
5 See Mittermaier, On the Effect of Drunkenness upon Criminal Responsibility
and the Application of Punishment (1840) 23 AmER. JuRIST 294.
6 Reniger v. Fogossa, I Plowden I, 7g Eng. Rep. I (K. B. '551).
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drunkenness is no defense have been highly effective. Hale supported the rule " partly from the easiness of counterfeiting the
disability." I Wharton believed that " There could rarely be a
conviction for homicide if drunkenness avoided responsibility," 8
and he also feared it would deliberately be resorted to " as a
shield." Other competent observers, Stephen included, believed
that most homicides and many other crimes were caused by intoxication, and that, apparently by sheer force of statistics, it would
not do to relax the restraint. Story, apparently influenced by
Coke's somber righteousness, stressed the merit of" the law allowing not a man to avail himself of the excuse of his own gross vice
and misconduct to shield himself from the legal consequences of
such crime."
These views can be supplemented by widely varying rules in different countries. They fall into no readily perceived
pattern. Thus there are civilian systems which punish as severely
as do the common-law countries, and on substantially similar
grounds. There are Latin countries, like France, where the penalties are more severe than are those of the German and Austrian imperial codes. Such a diversity of legislation 10 must itself raise
doubt concerning the validity of the arguments of the eminent proponents of the Anglo-American rules. In such circumstances the
reliance of the contemporary investigator can only be on the best
available knowledge, in the light of which the various policies implied in these views and legal systems can be appraised.
But one of the grounds put forth, that drunkenness can be readily feigned, may be disposed of at once. No reason has been
advanced why determination of this fact presents any greater difficulty than do those raised by" mistake," "legal provocation," "insanity," or many others; indeed, the contrary seems more probable
when it is considered that the history of the defendant and the
events preceding his wrongful act are examined in greater detail
7 1 HALE, HISTORY OF TE PLEAS OF TH CROWN (1736) 32.
8 1 WHARTON, CRn1.NAL LAW (X932) 95; cf. H. M. Com3missIONERS' SEVENTH
REPORT ON CRIMNAL LAW (1843) 19-

1 United States v. Drew, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,993 (C. C. D. Mass. 1828). Note
his premise that the crime charged has been committed, that the intoxication is merely
something superadded.
10 See Lee, Drunkenness and Crime (1902) 27 LAW MAG. &REV. (5th ser.) 144,
157, 308; Mittermaier, On the Effect of Drunkenness upon Criminal Responsibility
and the Application of Punishment (1840) 23 AmER. JURIST 294; BARBIER, LE DLIT
ALCOOLIQUE (1930) 56 ff., 99 ff.
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in the drunkenness cases than is usual. Moreover the burden of
proving intoxication was, and usually is, placed on the defendant. 1
Simulation of intoxication to avoid responsibility for a crime presupposes, moreover, high intelligence, histrionic ability, and careful calculation. Even a superficial survey of the cases shows that
the inebriate offenders typify the very opposite qualities - they
are weak, impulsive, and frequently diseased. In light of these
various considerations, the persistently voiced fear of deception
suggests the presence of influences other than the reasons that are
expressed. Since a person who planned to commit a crime would
not wish to incapacitate himself by becoming grossly intoxicated
(and that is the degree relevant to the moot issues of penal responsibility), even less persuasive is the argument that prospective offenders would actually become intoxicated " as a shield." Such
professed grounds of decision indicate bias against inebriate wrongdoers rather than rational support of the rule.
There is, moreover, internal evidence in Anglo-American law
that the supporters of the prevailing rules themselves experienced
serious doubts, misgivings that were reflected in mitigating doctrines left at odds with countervailing legal principles, but, nonetheless, steps in a wiser, more humane direction. Although the
rule concerning voluntary intoxication has persisted formally, a
radical modification in the law occurred in the nineteenth century.
It seems to have been suggested first by Holroyd in a murder case
in 1819 that, while voluntary drunkenness could not be a complete
excuse, it should be considered in determining premeditation. 2
The prescient Justice is said to have later retracted this view; in
any event, Justice Park later confidently asserted that " there
would be no safety for human life if it were to be considered as
law," "3and the defendant in the case was executed. There was
some tendency to relax the rule in a later case of aggravated assault
but this was largely negatived by equivocal instructions that if a
stick were used, then the drunkenness was relevant," but where a
dangerous weapon is used, which, if used, must produce grievous
bodily harm, drunkenness can have no effect on the consideration
1" Wilson v. State, 6o N. J. L. I7M, 37 Atl. 954 (1897) ; Gustavenson v. State,
68 Pac. ioo6 (Wyo. 1902); see UNDERHULL, CumwnAL EViDENCE (4th ed. 1935) 625.
-2 Rex v. Grindley, quoted in Rex v. Carroll, 7 C. & P. 145, 173 Eng. Rep. 64

(N. P. 1835).
Is Id. at 147, I73 Eng. Rep. at 65.
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of the malicious intent of the party."
But in 838 in a case of assault with intent to murder, the jury was instructed that gross intoxication might disprove the intention required for the aggravated
offense. 5 The exception, slow to take root, 6 was carefully stated
by Stephen in language which became accepted as the major exculpatory doctrine, establishing the most important change in the
entire law of criminal responsibility of inebriates. " Although,"
said Stephen, "you cannot take drunkenness as any excuse for
crime, yet when the crime is such that thd intention of the party
committing it is one of its constituent elements, you may look at
the fact that a man was in drink in considering whether he formed
the intention necessary to constitute the crime." " Stephen's formulation definitely established the emerging avenue to long-desired
mitigation of punishment of grossly inebriated homicides. It was
technically persuasive; it has been applied and reiterated in hundreds of cases. The judges insist straight-facedly that the doctrine
is quite consistent with the traditional rule that voluntary drunkenness never excuses; it is simply that an objective material element,
"intention," is lacking in harms committed in gross intoxication.
Logic and law, but not sentiment for drunkards, effect the mitigation - so runs the rationalization.
One might well have imagined that the new exculpatory doctrine
would have undermined the rigorous traditional rule completely in
such a field as criminal law where mens rea is a general requisite.
But the indicated limitations persist, 8 enmeshed in an intricate
structure of theory that is posited on basic principles whose validity is assumed. These complexities are, of course, not found in the
14 Rex v. Meakin, 7 C. & P. 297, 173 Eng. Rep. 131 (N. P. 1836); cf. State v.
Kale, 124 N. C. 816, 32 S. E. 892 (I899), where a conviction of murder in the first
degree was affirmed. The court there stated that "Drunkenness . . . does not repel
malice nor lower the grade of the crime." Id. at 819, 32 S. E. at 896.
15 Regina v. Cruse, 8 C. & P. 541, 173 Eng. Rep. 6io (N. P. 1838).
16 It was stated in Regina v. Monkhouse, 4 Cox Cr. C. 55 (N. P. 1849).
17 Regina v. Doherty, i6 Cox Cr. C. 3o6, 308 (N. P. 1887). In his Digest of the
Criminal Law (5th ed. 1894), at p. 22, Stephen used the term "specific intention."
In Regina v. Baines (Lancs. Assizes, i886), Justice Day said: "I have ruled that if
a man were in such a state of intoxication that he did not know the nature of his
act or that his act was wrongful, his act would be excusable." London Times, Jan.
25, x886, p. io, col. 4. No English case has gone to that extent despite a similar
dictum in Beard's Case (14 Crim. App. 197 (H. L. 1920)).
18 See pp. 1051-54, io65-66 infra.
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few states which simply reject the exculpatory doctrine in toto."9
So, too, the doctrine is sometimes ignored in cases that outrage
morality,2 as in a recent Texas decision where the defendant failed
to stop his automobile after hitting a woman. His plea that he
was " crazy drunk " and did not know his car had struck the
woman was rejected, the defendant's "lack of knowledge having
arisen because of his voluntary intoxication." 2 Even when lipservice is paid the exculpatory doctrine, it is sometimes sharply
curtailed, even rendered entirely ineffective, by the insistence
that "the intoxication must be, in order to be available, of that
degree and extent as renders the defendant practically an automaton." 22 And the burden of proof of lack of capacity to entertain the required intent is placed upon the defendant.22 Thus there
continues to be explicit resistance to the exculpatory doctrine in
many quarters, and the types of cases in which this occurs as well
as the reasons advanced illustrate the persistence of traditional
moral attitudes. But the doctrine permitting disproof of intention
has been widely accepted and, no doubt, it has functioned to ameliorate the severe operation of the older law in most jurisdictions.
It is these jurisdictions, at any rate, that provide the complex and
interesting problems.
The major qualification on the potential efficacy, of the exculpatory doctrine results from its limitation to specific intention. As
Bishop, summarizing the prevailing rule, put it: "Evidence of intoxication therefore is admissible for the purpose of ascertaining
. . . whether he was incapable of entertaining the specific intent
charged, where such an intent, under the law, is an essential ingredient of the particular crime alleged to have been committed." 24
It is necessary, before examining the validity of this interpretation
of the meaning of the exculpatory doctrine, to note the effect of
See Note (1925) 26
39 E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. ANx. (1939) c. 31, art. 4, § 4379.
U. oF Mo. BuLL. L. SER. 32, 59.
L. 457, 458;
20 E.g., assault with intent to rape. See Note (1934) 25 J. CR.
cf. State v. Comer, 296 Mo. 1, 247 S. W. 179 (1922).
21 Martinez v. State, i37 Tex. Cr. App. 434, 441, 128 S. W.(2d) 398, 401 (1939).
22 Tate v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 685, 695,80 S. W.(2d) 817, 821 (i935).
23 See note ii supra.
24 1 BISEop, CRan-mAI, LAw (9th ed. 1923)

299.

Cf. "...

where a particular

intent is charged, and such intent forms the gist of the offense, as contradistinguished
from the intent necessarily entering into every crime ....
111. 325, 342, 27 N. E. 49, 52 (1891).

"

Crosby v. People, 137
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judicial decision operating on these premises and applying the exculpatory doctrine to the most serious harms.
The application of the doctrine in homicide cases results mostly
in conviction for second degree murder. In a minority of states
and in England, the reduction is greater, and the judgment is manslaughter.25 This diversity might be expected to result from differences in statutes as to the requirement of "intent " in murder of
the second degree; but usually only premeditation is excluded.2
Hence it is clear that there are influences other than the statutes.
Thus in a recent Pennsylvania case,27 where the statute is of the
more frequent type, the court held that intoxication would not
mitigate unless the defendant were "incapable of conceiving any
intent," in which event "his grade of offense is reduced to murder
in the second degree." 28 The formula accepted in the majority
view is that: "As between the two offenses of murder in the second
degree and manslaughter, voluntary intoxication cannot be a legitimate subject of inquiry. What constitutes murder in the second degree by a sober man is equally murder in the second degree
if committed by a drunken man." 2 9 While the courts do not adequately explain why manslaughter cannot be" a legitimate subject
of inquiry," the reasons may be surmised. The dominating analogy
is "legal provocation," and since intoxication is presumed to be
unacceptable to that end, the majority view is strictly consistent
with the law of voluntary manslaughter, ° which includes intentional homicide. The presence of influences other than statutes is
revealed in the dogmatism of the majority view that "Where a
homicide results from the use of a dangerous and deadly weapon,
25

For a collection of cases, see Notes

A. L. R. 897, 904. See also Note

(1921)

12

(1920) 29 YALE L.

A. L. R. 86i, 875; (1932) 79
J. 928.

Some doubt is cast on the English law by several harsh decisions.

E.g., Rex v.

Scholey, 3 Crim. App. 183 (Crim. App. i9o9).

See Borland v. State, 249 S. W. 591 (Ark. 1923).
Commonwealth v. Lehman, 309 Pa. 486, 164 AtI. 526 (1932).
28 Id. at 499, 264 Atl. at 53o.
29 Wilson v. State, 6o N. J. L. I7i, 184, 37 AtI. 954, 958 (1897).
This formula
has been applied "even when the intoxication is so extreme as to make a person
unconscious of what he is doing, or to create a temporary insanity." Gustavenson
v. State, 68 Pac. ioo6, 2oo (Wyo. 1902). In this latter case, the court cites as
authority, Upstone v. People, io9 Ill. x69 (1883), and 2 BISHOP, CamMqAL LAW
(8th ed. 1892) § 400. Cf. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 524, 115 S. E. 673
28

27

(1923).

30 See State v. Aragon, 35 N. M.

198, 292

Pac.

225 (1930).
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the law implies malice, and an intention to kill from the effective
use of the weapon, and, therefore, the crime is presumably murder
in the second degree." "' It is apparent also that although the
minority view " reaches results that are defensible, the avowed
methods and analysis are fallacious. Frequently the cases show
reliance on the patently false assumption that "intent" is not required in manslaughter." If intent were actually lacking, the
effect of application of the exculpatory doctrine would, at most, be
involuntary manslaughter which requires only "criminal negligence," " but this is nowhere alleged to be the ground for liability.
Both majority and minority interpretations are further confused
by the overriding doctrine that murder requires no "specific intent," that "general intent" is sufficient. 5 Thus, a majority of
American states implement the exculpatory doctrine only as regards premeditation whereas in the minority, the doctrine is applied both to exclude premeditation and to provide an equivalent
for" legal provocation."
There is not the least admission anywhere, however, that drunkenness constitutes "legal provocation." On the contrary, so far
as their utterances are concerned, it is clear that the courts do not
relax the rules on" legal provocation" to include homicides under
gross intoxication. 6 They deny legal effect to the admitted fact
that drunken persons are more easily aroused and lose self-control
more readily than do sober ones. Nor will they allow intoxication
31 Aszman v. State, 123 Ind. 356 (1889); cf. People v. Leonardi, 135 N. Y. 360,
38 N. E. 372 (3894). "He may be perfectly unconscious of what he does and yet
responsible. He may be incapable of express malice; but the court imputes malice
in such a case." Johnson v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 524, 527, 115 S. E. 673, 674-75
(1923).
32 See

Laws v. State, I44 Ala. 118, 42 So. 40 (905); State v. Rumble, io5 Pac. z
(Kan. i9o9); State v. Corrivau, 93 Minn. 38, ioo N. W. 638 (1904).
a3 In these instances, no special statutes are involved, nor is the manslaughter
classified as "involuntary."
s1 See Note (192I) 6 CoraN. L. Q. 193.
35 See pp. IO64-65 infra.
"
36 At least one case, however, states that where what the law deems sufficient
provocation has been given," drunkenness may be considered because "passion is
more easily excitable." Rex v. Thomas, 7 C. & P. 8,7, 173 Eng. Rep. 356 (N. P.
1820).
This rather ambiguously suggests modification of the usual rule, but no
English case appears to have adopted the implication. Cf. Rex v. Birchall, 9 Crim.
App. 91 (Crim. App. 193); Rex v. Letenock, 12 Crim. App. 221 (Crim. App. i9z7);
State v. Hurley, i Houst. Cr. Rep. 28 (Del. 1858).
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to enter the jury's determination on "cooling-time." On the contrary, they do not hesitate to color the jury's calculation by instructing that: "The question is, was there time for a reasonable
man, in like circumstances, to have cooled, not a drunkard or a
madman," 11 stressing that no indulgence should be granted to
one who had" taken the quantity of liquor requisite to make him a
savage." 11 The reason for refusing to equate drunkenness with
legal provocation, namely, that since "drunkenness does not excuse homicide, so by the same token it may not be available as a
factor contributing to heat of passion," "9is hardly persuasive in
the light of the exculpatory doctrine that is simultaneously avowed.
When it is recalled that "legal provocation" is a mitigating doctrine which " indulgeth human frailty," 40 the import of the refusal
to relax the rules on account of drunkenness is recognized. The
meaning must be that there are different evaluations that are defensible, that it is right to reduce a killing to voluntary manslaughter if committed in a fight "-or in sight of adultery, whereas
a person who" deliberately gets drunk "merits no like extenuation.
The courts, interpreting the exculpatory doctrine quite literally,
find no inconsistency in restricting it to the requirement of intention and at the same time rejecting any claim of loss of control because of intoxication. But such insistence hardly squares with the
facts which show just as plainly as in legal provocation that the
defendant did entertain the necessary intention but was without
normal control of his conduct. Rather obviously, harms committed by inebriates reveal not wild, disorganized, aimless, motor
37

State v. McCants, z Speers 391 (S.C. 1843).

38 Id.at 395.

39 State v. Aragon, 35 N. M. x98, 200, 292 Pac. 225, 227 (1930). Cf. Bishop v.
United States, 107 F.(2d) 297 (App. D. C. 939); McGaffin v. State, 178 Ala. 40,
59 So. 635 (1912); Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 3 Gray 463 (Mass. 1855); Keenan
v. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. 55 (1862) ; Pirtle v. State, 9 Humph. 663 (Tenn. 1849).
Similarly when mistake is pleaded, the courts generally refuse to permit drunkenness to be considered. Springfield v. State, iI So. 250 (Ala. 1892) ; State v. Davis,
43 S. E. 99 (W. Va. 19o3). But cf. Rex v. Letenock, 12 Crim. App. 221 (Crim. App.
,917).
And in a prosecution for negligent homicide, a court held the defendant
subject to the same degree of care as a sober person. Haynes v. State, 224 S. W.
ioo (Tex. Cr. App. 1920).
40 Discourses, in FOSTER, CRowN CASES (1762) 291.
41 Cf. the even more liberal European law on excessive self-defense and the absence of the "objective" test.
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activity but conduct well adapted to attain specific goals.42 This
suggests that confusion is inescapable in the prevailing attempted
implementation of a mitigating doctrine stated in terms of " intention" where lack of intention is not an essential differentia as a
matter of fact.
The policy implicit in the prevailing law represents compromises
between the punishment of inebriate offenders in complete disregard of their condition, because it was brought on voluntarily, and
the total exculpation suggested by the actual facts at the time the
harm occurred. A balance, in other words, has been compounded
from a realization, on the one hand, that the moral culpability of a
drunken homicide should be distinguished from that of a sober person effecting a like injury, and from a persistence of the belief, on
the other hand, that a person who voluntarily indulges in alcohol
should not escape the consequences.
C VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION"

The incapacity of the inebriate is one pillar of the prevailing
evaluation, the other centers on the voluntariness of the intoxication. The initial difficulty in ascertaining the meaning of "voluntary," in connection with intoxication, results from the failure
of the courts to define the term explicitly. It is therefore necessary
to scrutinize the facts and analyze the relevant judicial language.
In the first English report on a drunken homicide 4 which affirmed
volition as its rationale, it was said that though the defendant
"did it through ignorance . . .that ignorance was occasioned

by his own act and folly, and he might have avoided it." "I The
rule, as formulated by Baron Parke, became fixed: "voluntary
drunkenness is no excuse for crime." " The current adjudica.tion represents a continued adherence to a rationalistic psychiology that ignores the complex, psychic apparatus of self-restraint.
The chief aid in defining "voluntary," which the courts have
42 See Johnson v. State, 129 Wis. 146, i6o, io8 N. W. 55, 6i (i9o6). See also
H. M. Co
ssioNERs' SEVENTH REPORT ON CRumiL LAW (1843) 20.
43 Reniger v. Fogossa, i Plowden i, 75 Eng. Rep. i (K. B. i551). See 8 HoLDsWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH

LAW (1937) 441.

44 1 Plowden at xg, 75 Eng. Rep. at 31.
45 Pearson's Case, 2 Lew. C. C. 144, i68 Eng. Rep. iio8 (N. P. 1835). Baron
Alderson, the following year, could add to the already classic formula only the illuminating remark that " If a man chooses to get drunk, it is his own voluntary act."
Rex v. Meakin, 7 C. & P. 297, 173 Eng. Rep. 131, 132 (N. P. 1836).
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provided, has been by way of specific exception from liability, for
example, Baron Parke's remark in Pearson'sCase: " If a party be
made drunk by stratagem, or the fraud of another, he is not responsible." " The courts interpret " coercion" in this connection,
quite literally, to mean that one was " forced . . . to drink" " by

overt, physical acts. " Fraud," which is generally equated with
force in the criminal law, is also so rigorously restricted as, for example, to exclude imposition upon the young and inexperienced by
calculating adults. Thus a boy of sixteen was admitted to a gambling house where the proprietor plied him with whiskey in order to
cheat him in the play. In a fight, the boy, drunk to the point of
admitted "temporary insanity," killed the calloused operator.
Holding that "involuntary intoxication is a very rare thing and
can never exist where the person intoxicated knows what he is
drinking, and drinks the intoxicant voluntarily, and without being
made to do so by force or coercion," the court affirmed a conviction
and sentence of twelve years imprisonment.48 In a tragic case of
patricide, the son sought to show that his father supplied the liquor
and urged him to drink it. The intoxication was held "voluntary." " In a much more suggestive case, a college student under
eighteen, who had never before tasted intoxicating liquor, was given
a ride by the deceased in his automobile. The latter had been
drinking heavily and insisted that the boy participate, becoming
abusive and threatening to put him off in the Arizona desert if he
refused. The court, noting that the "defendant, being alone,
penniless, and fearing that he might be ejected and left on the
desert did drink some beer and whiskey," nonetheless held that involuntary intoxication "must be induced by acts amounting in
effect to duress." " So, finally, although it has been stated that
"taking liquor prescribed by a physician" is a defense,5 ' a court
was unwilling to entertain the plea that the defendant drank to obtain relief from an acute pain. 2
These cases are not selected specimens of extreme adjudication.
2 Lew. C. C. at I45, i68 Eng. Rep. at iioS.
47 Borland v. State, 249 S. W. 591, 594 (Ark. 1923).
48 Perryman v. State, 12 Okla. Cr. App. 500, x59 Pac. 937 (i916).
46

49 State v. Sopher, 30 N. W. 917 (Iowa 1886).
5c Burrows v. State, 38 Ariz. 99, 116, 297 Pac.

1029, 1o36

(i93i).

51 See Choate v. State, I9 Okla. Cr. App. 169, 197 Pac. io6o
Commonwealth, 135 Va. 524, 1i5 S. E. 673 (1923).
52

(1921) ;

Johnson v. Commonwealth, i35 Va. 524, 115 S. E. 673 (923).

Johnson v.
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The amazing thing about the factual situations met in the decisions
on intoxication, which, because of the usual judicial stress on fraud
and coercion as exculpatory, becomes apparent only after close
study of the cases, is that involuntary intoxication is simply and
completely nonexistent. It is hazardous to generalize so unqualifiedly concerning such an enormous body of law as that on crimes
committed by inebriates; but the reports record hardly a single
decision actually holding that the defendant was involuntarily intoxicated." The opinions invariably hold that the intoxication
was "voluntary," but with equal uniformity they reiterate that
fraud or coercion is a perfect defense. The encyclopedias and
treatises give the dicta equal status with the judgments, enhancing
the illusion that the matter has been adjudicated and that there
exists an actual rule. But the contrary import of the huge volume
of relevant case-law and of the enormous diversity of situations
represented is plain: "fraud," narrowly interpreted in these cases
to require complete innocence of the nature of alcoholic drink,
wrongfully induced, cannot be perpetrated even on normal children of the age of legal capacity. As regards" coercion," the caselaw implies that a person would need to be bound hand and foot,
and the liquor literally poured down his throat, or that he would
have to be threatened with immediate serious injury, before the
exception, so universally voiced, would have any effect on judicial
decision. So far as the extant law is concerned, there would be no
difference in the actual rule if it were announced flatly that no intoxicated person could ever claim that his condition was effected
by fraud or coercion. Thus it is apparent that the courts sternly
affirm that phase of the accepted policy that is posited on the
volition inferred from the drinking of alcoholic liquor. The prevailing adjudication is so rigorous in this regard as to transform
53 The reason for the slight qualification is the apparently unreported case of
Regina v. M. R., quoted in Lee, Drunkenness and Crime (1902) 27 LAW MAO. &
REV. (5th ser.) 147. And in a case decided more than one hundred years ago, the
complainant sold the defendant, a child of twelve, a cigar and a strong alcoholic
drink. Later the boy took the complainant's watch, and on a charge of larceny, the
court instructed the jury: "this case essentially differs from that where a crime is
committed by a person, who by a free indulgence of strong liquors, has at the time
voluntarily deprived himself of his reason." Commonwealth v. French, Thacher's
Cr. C. 163 (Mun. Ct. Boston 1827). But the court also intimated that the child
might have been temporarily insane, which diminished the force of the instruction
as to the lack of volition.
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the avowed " exceptions" into mere dicta which function only as
balm for the judicial conscience's rationalizing the infliction of severe penalties. It is accordingly worth emphasis that the validity
of the ultimate principles of culpability on which the decisions rest
does not depend on administration alone. These principles, signifying that voluntary conduct may be punishable but that involuntary conduct is not within the reach of punitive sanctions, are not
impeached because judges continue the routine of invoking the precept that "voluntary drunkenness is no excuse" in circumstances
where it is plain that the drunkenness was anything but " voluntary" in any realistic connotation.
Nor is the validity of the traditional principles impaired because
judges, untouched by modern science in these matters, hold many
persons liable, though they are in fact afflicted with well-known
diseases. The suspicion of a harsh moralistic bias raised by the
narrow construction of" fraud" and "coercion" where the courts
deal with the " voluntary intoxication" of normal defendants is
further supported by a consideration of certain typical cases that
involve abnormal persons. A rather frequent defense is that a
serious injury predisposed the defendant to alcoholic addiction.
It is claimed that a fracture of the skull," a blow on the head,5" an
injury to the brain," or some other serious accident " stimulated
indulgence or resulted in complete lack of control. These claims
are uniformly rejected by the courts, and the defendants are
treated as normal. But a recognized student of these problems
reports that persons " having had severe head injuries and sunstrokes, are particularly predisposed" to mental disease when
under the influence of alcohol. 8 Yet the courts insist that " this
is in law no excuse whatever . . . ." " On the contrary, such a
person is held even more culpable because, so it is argued, knowing his weakness, he should have put forth greater efforts to abstain, and convictions, even of murder, are upheld in such cases.
See Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424 (i86o).
See State v. Wilson, 104 N. C. 868, io S. E. 3iS (x889).
See State v. Kavanaugh, 4 Penne. 131, 53 Atl. 335 (Del. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1902).
57 See H. M. Advocate v. Campbell, [192X] Session Cases i (Ct. Just. 1920).
58 Lewis, Psychiatric Resultants of Alcoholism: Alcoholism and Mental Disease (i94i) 2 Q. J. STU.ALc. 293, 296.
59 Apparently the drug addict is similarly treated. See Note (1942) 17 NoTm
DAwx LAWYER 145.
54

55
56

1058

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

EVol. 57

The judicial logic is superb, but, unfortunately, their premises are
fallacious because they are formulated in disregard of available
medical knowledge. For in these cases, the claim of a serious head
injury is typically accompanied by well-marked psychopathic
symptoms of incapacity during sobriety as well as by sharp deterioration under intoxication.
Nonetheless, even if the defendant is believed to have been temporarily insane, he is held punishable because, in a perversion of
Blackstone's phrase, it is "an artificial voluntarily contracted
madness." "o In many cases it is clear that the defendant is mentally diseased. These are usually homicides where the motive for
killing was obviously irrational. The intoxicated defendant "cruelly shot down the deceased, while he was performing neighborly
and kindly acts for him." 61 He was found guilty of murder and
sentenced to die. A drunken blacksmith killed a dear friend.62
There was considerable evidence of insanity, testimony that liquor
made the defendant" crazy wild "; that his conduct at the time of
the killing was of a" very strange, wild and irrational character ";
that his mother, a sister and three brothers were insane, the
mother, sister and one brother dying in insane asylums, etc. The
superintendent of the state insane asylum, a qualified expert, testified that in his opinion the defendant was insane. In this case the
intoxication was merely a symptom of a major psychosis. But the
court treated the condition as the temporary result of voluntary
drunkenness, and the defendant was held guilty of murder. In a
case where the defendant killed a theatre cashier in an attempted
robbery, there was considerable testimony of mental abnormality,
accompanied by long excessive drinking. The defendant's eyes
were described as "wild and stormy and froth was running out of
his mouth." He kept talking to himself, refused to eat, had to be
carried into his home in a helpless drunken condition. On the
60 Blackstone was describing the gross intoxication of normal persons. One hundred years after Blackstone, an American judge held that "A man may have partial
or general insanity, and that, too, from blows on the head, yet if he drink, and bring
on temporary fits of drunkenness, and while under the influence of spirits, takes life,
he is responsible." Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424, 48o-8i (i86o).
This opinion contains some of the choicest bits of psychological erudition exhibited in legal literature anywhere, e.g., "The fact is, responsibility depends upon
the possession of will -not the power over it." Id. at 474.
6 Buckhannon v. Commonwealth, 86 Ky. I1o, 111, 5 S. W. 358 (1887).
62 Upstone v. People, zog Ill. i69 (1883).
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night of the killing, his mother had called the police, asking them
to take her son to a hospital. Here again, the intoxication was
merely symptomatic of a serious psychosis, but it stimulated the
bias against " voluntary" inebriates. He was found guilty of
murder and hanged.6" The harshness of prevailing adjudication
is evident in a case where the defendant killed a clerk over a petty
argument about being served, and the court held, "Temporary
insanity, occasioned immediately by drunkenness, does not destroy
responsibility for crime, where the defendant, when sane and responsible, voluntarily makes himself drunk." " The theory is that
unless the defendant is " permanently" insane, his mental condition should be entirely ignored on the inhibiting assumption that
the intoxication was "voluntary." As a Michigan court forthrightly stated, "he must be held to have intended this extraordinary derangement . . . and the other results produced by it."

65

Such decisions are not rare; they represent settled judicial attitudes which could be illustrated indefinitely.
The rigor of the prevailing doctrine would be considerably lessened if the courts recognized that addiction to alcohol is a disease.
But the level of diagnosis characteristic of these cases is also represented in the judges' opinion that dipsomania is not a defense.66
Thus a conviction of murder in the second degree was sustained
where the defendant, who had become a morphine addict five years
previously following the death of his wife, also drank very heavily,
consuming a quart of liquor a day for several years preceding the
killing.67 A like decision was upheld where the evidence showed
that the defendant was a degenerate, who, for ten years preceding
the homicide, "had been addicted to strong drink, including whiskey, brandy, absinthe, and every other kind of drink sold in saloons; that he . . . suffered from delirium tremens, and . . .

with a chronic disease which deeply impaired his nervous system;
that on the night in question he was suffering from a recent surgical
operation which gave him great pain," and so on.68 There are
63 People v. Brislane, 295 Ill. 241 (1920).
64 Collier v. State, 17 Okla. Cr. App. 139, 151, 186 Pac. 963, 966 (1920), quoting
from Cheadle v. State, ii Okla. Cr. App. 566, 57i, 149 Pac. gig, 922 (I915).
65 Roberts v. People, i9 Mich. 401, 422 (1870).
66 See State v. Kidwell, 62 W. Va. 466, 59 S. E. 494 (1907).
67 State v. English, 164 N. C. 497, 80 S. E. 72 (1913).
68

Atkins v. State, ii9 Tenn. 458, 462, 1O5 S. W. 353, 354 (i9o7).
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many similar cases whose clinical picture bears unmistakable
marks of mental abnormality. A court which heard credible evidence that the defendant was from boyhood known as "crazy
Nick," that drinking "put him in a frenzy," that he was" a steady
drinker," that after a night's absence, he came home "terribly
intoxicated," took his Sunday clothes and chopped them into little
pieces, still found that the intoxication was i'voluntary," and
therefore there was no excuse "even when the intoxication is so
extreme as to make the person unconscious of what he is doing, or
to create a temporary insanity." 69 The court summarily dismissed
the claim of delirium tremens, asserting there was "nothing more
or less than the condition of mind usually resulting from a condition of thorough drunkenness." 7" To cap its tragic innocence of
the relevant psychiatric knowledge, the court confidently added:
"It would be utterly impossible to distinguish between the two
conditions of mind, if in reality there be a difference between the
two." 11 In a recent California case the defendant had been taken

from an old men's home and given employment doing odd chores.
After a trivial dispute, the deceased pushed the defendant who
shortly thereafter became intoxicated and killed him. The alienists testified that the defendant "was very emotional and alcohol
releases these inhibitions "; that the man would never do such a
deed unless he had been drinking. He was syphilitic, had hardening of the arteries, was quite susceptible to the alcohol, " was definitely confused and reacted emotionally and almost instinctively."
The court held that his condition at the time of the homicide "was
a state voluntarily brought about, and therefore was no excuse for
the crime." It affirmed conviction of murder in the first degree
and the death sentence. 2
Thus we find many competent courts ignoring serious physical
injuries, addiction, chronic alcoholism, delirium tremens, confusing psychoses because accompanied by intoxication, and, in general, adhering to a course of adjudication that can only be regarded
as unenlightened. The combined result of narrowing " fraud"
and "coercion" to the vanishing point when dealing with normal
69 State v. Kraemer, 49 La. 766,
70 Id. at 774, 22 So. at 257.
71

22

So. 254 (1897).

Ibid.

72 People v. Smith, 14 Cal.(2d) 45', 95 P.(2d) 453 (1939).
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persons and refusing to acknowledge that many defendants are
diseased, implemented by traditional, and in its proper place
praiseworthy, disapproval of drunkards is harsh law that adds
cruelty to misfortune. The personal remorse consequent on realization of what happened is exceeded by the social tragedy of severe
punishment for harms committed under gross intoxication, not infrequently by persons who are seriously diseased. Yet it is clear
that at least since Stephen, able judges have tried to alleviate the
rigor of the criminal responsibility of inebriates. It is equally
plain that the continued unsatisfactory state of the law is in large
part due to the methods employed to achieve the desired mitigation. Thus in the existing law there is confusion resulting from the
application of the exculpatory doctrine to the defendant's condition at the time he committed the harm as well as a formalism and
rigor in the interpretation of "voluntary intoxication."
" SPECIFIC

INTENT "

AS A TECHNIQUE OF MITIGATION

It is easy to understand the motivation that led Stephen and
succeeding judges to reliance on the "general intent" principle as
the most likely technique to achieve mitigation, and thus to formulate the exculpatory doctrine by reference to it. The solid, unavoidable fact was that a harm committed under gross intoxication
ought to be clearly distinguished from a like injury by a sober
person. The challenge to ethical judgment and to common sense
was unmistakable. On the other hand, the commission by a normal
person of a serious injury, combined with traditional moral attitudes stigmatizing intoxication as a vice, indicated with equal
clarity the impropriety of complete exculpation. The rules on intent lay closest at hand to provide a plausible mediation. Most of
the harms met in these cases were homicides and aggravated assaults, 73 and here the doctrines concerning general and specific intent operated to produce the precise results desired.
These doctrines, supplying the ultimate support of the exculpatory rule, imply that "specific intent" is distinguishable from
"general intent." They signify also that certain crimes, notably
73 See Gray and Moore, The Incidence and Significance of Alcoholism in the

History of Criminals (194i) 3 J.CRM:. PSYCHOPATH. 289, 294; Lewis, Personality
Factorsin Alcoholic Addiction (1940) i Q. J. Srtu. ALc. 21, 29-30.
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murder, manslaughter, and assault, require only "general intent "
whereas most of the other offenses require certain " specific " intents. The incidence of the exculpatory doctrine on the latter
rules requires that wherever a " specific" intent is an essential element of a crime, and no lesser cognate offense requiring only" general intent" is available, the inebriate defendant must be acquitted.
Accordingly, in numerous crimes the exculpatory doctrine has
sweeping effect. Thus, in cases of assault with intent to murder,74
assault with intent to rape,7 5 burglary," attempted burglary,"7
larceny," passing counterfeit notes,7" and others, the defendant was
acquitted. Obviously complete exculpation in these situations is
at odds with the doctrine that "voluntary intoxication is no excuse "; it is opposed by scientific judgment that there is partial
responsibility in many of these cases. Moreover, such complete
exculpation is posited on an alleged lack of "specific intent" and
on an avowed refusal to make any concessions because of impairment of control. Yet it is commonplace that in most of these cases
a criminal intent is present; it is normal restraint that has dissolved in the flowing cup.
The chief import of this total exculpation may be inferred from
the fact that the vast majority of cases, at least of those reported,
which involve serious harms by inebriates are homicides and cases
of serious assault - and here drunkenness is usually admitted
only to refute murder in the first degree and aggravation of the
assault. In these latter situations it is emphasized that" of course
... voluntary intoxication furnishes no excuse for crime." 80
74 Roberts v. People, ig Mich. 401 (I87o), held that this crime was not like
murder, which requires no specific intent. The court relied on Bishop as authority.
75 State v. Donovan, 6i Iowa 369, i6 N. W. 206 (1883).
76 Schwabacher v. People, 165 Ill.
618, 46 N. E. 809 (1897); State v. Bell, 29
Iowa 3x6 (187o).

People v. Jones, 263 Ill.
564, 1o5 N. E. 744 (1914).
78 Chatham v. State, 9 So. 607 (Ala. z8gi) (citing Regina v. Moore, 3 C. & K.
319, 175 Eng. Rep. 571 (N. P. 1852)); State v. Kavanaugh, 4 Penne. 131, 53 Atl.
6oi (1882) ; People
335 (Del. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1902) ; Bartholomew v. People, 104 Ill.
v. Walker, 38 Mich. I56 (,878).
9 United States v. Roudenbush, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,198 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1832);
O'Grady v. State, 36 Neb. 320, 54 N. W. 556 (1893) ; Pigman v. State, 14 Ohio 555
(1846). But cf. Clinton v. State, 132 Tex. Cr. App. 303, I04 S.W.(2d) 39 (1937)
(burglary). Texas has a rigorous statute on the subject. TEx. Ar. PEN. CoDE
(Vernon, 1925) art. 1545-47.
80 State v. Bell, 29 Iowa 316, 319 (1870).
77
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Certainly the doctrinal effect suggested by juxtaposition of the
decisions on robbery, larceny, etc. and those on homicide and aggravated assault is an odd composition. It obliges us to reject the
convention that intoxication is never admitted as an "excuse " but
only to establish the lack of a material element of certain crimes.
Even where " excuse" is sharply distinguished from "justification," as in European systems, the former concerns personal
grounds for exculpation, like insanity or infancy -and intoxication is clearly included here rather than under "justification"
which relates to certain external facts, such as self-defense. The
common assertion that intoxication is no " excuse" amounts not
to any such technical distinction, but rather to a patent rationalization of inconsistency with an avowed moral attitude. Viewed
solely from grounds of policy, it is impossible to support the widely
divergent results. Certainly some of the crimes admittedly requiring "specific intent" are as harmful as many cases of manslaughter, and carry more severe penalties. Yet there is complete exculpation in the former and only occasionally does a more inquiring
court note the incongruity."' The particular question to be considered is the technical validity of the ultimate legal doctrines relied upon, namely, the distinction between " general" and "specific " intent, and the allegation that only the former is required
in the case of homicide or assault.
The meaning of any term employed in legal discourse is either
popular or technical, the latter frequently representing the imposition of a professional superstructure upon an initially common
word. Hence, in analysis of such conceptions as "general" and
"specific" intent, it will be agreed that one had better start with
the ordinary meaning of the terms. It is true, of course, that " intention," even when not technically interpreted, has various meanings. But a common unequivocal core persists and it is that mean8 "The law does not imply the intent in cases of the kind, from the breaking
and entering, or entering without breaking. If life, however, be taken, by the use
of a deadly weapon, the law implies malice, and there would hence be murder, though
the perpetrator was drunk. This is the more evident when we know that one may
be guilty of murder without intending to take life, as he may in other cases intend
to take life and yet not commit a crime. Or, still again, drunkenness may quite
supply the place of malice aforethought, which may be general, not special, but it
cannot that of specific intent. Bishop's Cr. Law, vol. i §§ 389, 490, 491; notes and
cases there cited. We confess that the doctrine touching cases of this character is
not placed upon the clearest ground in the books." Id. at 320.
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ing which is designated in legal discourse differentiating it from
"motive." Ordinary introspection and most psychologies in one
fashion or another recognize" intention " as a state of mind, referable to intelligence, and evidenced by the overt adaptation of means
to attain desired ends. While there are degrees of concentration
or intensity in the response designated "intentional conduct," the
paramount fact is that neither common experience nor psychology
knows any such actual phenomenon as "general intent" that is
distinguishable from " specific intent." Viewed from this surest
base in the shifting linguistic terrain, the most likely alternative is
that "general intent" has a technical meaning in law, one which
does not denote any reality but which may nonetheless serve a useful purpose. This interpretation is supported by examination of
the situations to which " general intent" is applied. The most
important class of such situations are cases where the defendant,
intending to commit a particular wrong, actually commits another,
unintended harm. Thus in assault 2 and in homicide, the typical
facts are that the defendant attempts to strike A, misses him and
hits B; the defendant attempts to kill A, fails and kills B. In such
cases the unvarying ethical judgment expressed in Anglo-American
law is that the defendant is just as culpable as if he had succeeded
in carrying out his actual intention (although the doctrine of other
legal systems, that the defendant has committed two crimes, attempted murder of A and manslaughter of B, should stimulate reexamination of our law). But the fundamental principles of criminal law require that there be an intention to commit a battery or
to kill or seriously injure and that this intention "concur " with
the harmful effects actually produced. The courts exhibit their
usual penchant for consistency of doctrine in their discourse; the
actual intent is "transferred" (formally) to the actual consequences, and the rationalization is that the defendant had a "general criminal intent," which means not one tittle more than that he
had an actual intent to commit a battery or to kill or seriously injure some person.83 " General intent" is employed similarly in
discussion of reckless and negligent conduct whenever the harmful
effects are such that sound policy seems to require penal liability. 4
Keeton v. Commonwealth, 92 Ky. 522, 18 S. W. 359 (1892).
13Cf. Sayre, Mens Rea in Criminal Law, in HAR AD LEGAL ESSAYS (X934)

82

399,

412.
84 Cf.

Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea (i939)

52

HARv. L. REv. 905, 9o9.
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In the reification of their technique, the courts also speak of
"transferred" or "constructive" intent, which obviously denote
no existing reality. What has been said of "general intent" applies equally to "constructive" intent and " transferred" intent
- only more plainly. Such "intent "has never been nor can it be
experienced by any mind. The import, again, is that some ground
of policy justifies or is thought to require responsibility despite the
absence of any actual intent to commit the harm. It may be assumed for the present argument that, as regards intentional conduct, where the harm actually effected was foreseeable and as
serious as the one sought, such verbal techniques as "transferred
intent" and "general intent," however cumbersome and hazardous to clear analysis, are defensible on grounds of policy, although,
as indicated in other legal systems, the results reached are by no
means unquestionable. But, even though we assume the validity
of this underlying policy, the chief point to be stressed is not that
there was no " specific intention," but that on the contrary, there
was an intention (specific.) to assault or kill a human being, and
that therefore, in light of the actual results, the error in execution
is inconsequential.
If this essential meaning of the situations to which the "general
intent" doctrine applies is borne in mind, it is clear that the material facts in the intoxication cases must be interpreted differently.
Here we do not have a sober person who intends to commit one
harm, and actually commits another one. On the contrary, a
grossly intoxicated person commits the very harm he intends to
commit. Thus it is true here, to stress the salient fact, that there
was never an intent to kill or seriously injure by a sober person.
But the other equally important fact is that in some cases the state
of dangerousness under intoxication was culpably induced. These
facts constitute the central problem to be confronted, which no
amount of technicality can obscure to common sense. It must now
be plain that if the courts actually applied the exculpatory doctrine without violence to the established meaning of the words, that
application would have little, if any, effect since (specific) intent
is present in harms by inebriates; typically what is lacking is control and ethical sensitivity. We have seen that, in fact, the exculpatory doctrine is given diverse effect. The prevailing confusion
is the result of misdirected efforts to implement an exculpatory
doctrine that is erroneously formulated in terms that are irrelevant
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to the situations actually found in harms by inebriates. The diverse rules resulting from application of the exculpatory doctrine
rest on and augment the existing confusion in the criminal law
produced by the fiction of "general" and " specific" intent.
THE INFLUENCE OF INVALID ANALOGIES ON RESPONSIBILITY
The "specific intent" doctrine is a technique for expression of
the policy of alleviation of the rigor of penal liability of inebriates.
Equally potent, but far less defensible because they limit the
formation of a sound policy, are certain other doctrines that
strengthen the prevailing evaluation of "voluntary intoxication."
Specifically, the judges are met by "criminal negligefice" and the
felony-murder, misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrine; the law on
the criminal responsibility of inebriates is confused by reliance
upon these doctrines, whose validity is assumed, as analogies. Obviously a modification of opinion on the "wrongness" of intoxication would affect such reliance radically5 5
The confusion in the current law of homicide - and that law is
the chief reference of the analogies noted above - results in large
measure from the ambiguity of "criminal negligence," and its consequent inconsistency with principles that are defensible bases of
penal liability.8" Despite formal acknowledgment that "criminal
negligence" means recklessness, it is apparent that ordinary negligence is frequently held criminal.8" The consequent rationalizations concerning manslaughter comprise a dialectics of insidious,
entangling gossamer the farther the courts recede from the rational bases of penal liability. If the -underlying assumptions
should be recognized as false, if, e.g., ordinary negligence were excluded from penal liability, much of the current law of manslaughter must necessarily fall. It would follow that statutes which impose liability for homicide caused by "criminal negligence" would
85 A consideration of this problem from the viewpoint of contemporary science
is made at pp. 1072-76 infra, since change in the traditional mores may be influenced
by an understanding of the facts.
86 The -writer has discussed this problem at length elsewhere, arguing that only
intentional and reckless misconduct are proper grounds for penal liability. See
Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts: I (943) 43 CoL. L. REV. 753,
775-78.
87 See Jones v. Commonwealth, 213 Ky. 356, 281 S. W. 164
State, 178 Wis. 94, i89 N. W. 147 (1922).

(1926);

Njecick v.
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be confined to reckless misconduct. It would then follow, also,
that only when an inebriate was reckless in becoming intoxicated
could he be held criminally liable for a subsequent harm. Nor
would other, less articulated but nonetheless potent, value-judgments in the law of involuntary manslaughter persist to confound
the law on the penal responsibility of inebriates.
But closest at hand, and most influential in sustaining the present law on responsibility of inebriates, is the prevailing felonymurder, misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrine."5 This doctrine is
hardly distinguishable analytically from the " general intent " rule
and may be viewed as a phase of that same notion. But whereas
the policy underlying the latter rule is defensible where the defendant is held liable for an unintended harm only if he intended
to commit an equally serious one, here we confront a markedly
different situation. Under the felony-murder, misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrine, defendants are held liable for much more serious offenses than they intended to commit or were foreseeable. The
ambiguity of the value-judgment concerning "voluntary intoxication" provides ample scope for reference back to a prior
"wrong." The proximity, indeed, identity of the voluntary intoxication rule with the general notion of holding a person responsible for a harm because he committed another "wrong" causally
connected with it is thus plain.
The underlying rationale of the felony-murder doctrine -that
the offender has shown himself to be a "bad actor," and that this
is enough to exclude the niceties bearing on the gravity of the
harm actually committed -might have been defensible in early
law. The survival of the felony-murder doctrine is a tribute to
the tenacity of legal conceptions rooted in simple moral attitudes.
For as long ago as 1771, the doctrine was severely criticized by
88 " This is the first time, that I ever remember it to have been contended, that
the commission of one crime was an excuse for another. Drunkenness is a gross
vice, and, in contemplation of some of our laws is a crime; and I learned in my earliest studies that so far from its being in law an excuse for murder, it is rather an
aggravation of its malignity." Mr. justice Story, in United States v. Cornell, 25
Fed. Cas. No. 14,868 (C. C. D. R. I. 182o). Such a statement by so great a judge
reveals the complexity, if not the hopelessness, of the problem. The fact is that
drunkenness was never a crime at common law, and it never served as an aggravation. Nevertheless, when an intoxicated person committed a harm, it has seemed
quite persuasive for countless judges to posit responsibility on "voluntary intoxication.'
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Eden,89 who felt that it "may be reconciled to the philosophy of
slaves; but it is surely repugnant to that noble, and active confidence, which a free people ought to possess in the laws of their
constitution, the rule of their actions." 9" One hundred years later,
it seemed definitely on its way to be entirely discarded in Regina v.
Pembliton.9 ' The defendant had thrown a stone, intending to hit
certain persons, but instead it broke a window, and he was charged
with the statutory crime of malicious injury to property. The
prosecution stressed "general" and "transferred" intent, that
there was malice against the persons at whom the stones were
aimed, and that "a man must be taken to intend the consequence
of an unlawful act." But the court rejected this argument even
though the defendant was engaged in the intentional commission
of a crime - the situation where, under the earlier law, least difficulty was felt in holding him responsible for whatever happened.
Even more significant was Regina v. Faulkner " where the defendant, a sailor on a ship carrying a cargo of rum, went to the forecastle to steal some of it, bored a hole in a cask, and the flowing
liquor contacting a lighted match held by the defendant caused a
fire, completely demolishing the ship. The Crown contended that
since the defendant was engaged in commission of a felony, the
lack of intent to burn the ship was irrelevant. Only the traditional
doctrine was involved because the foreseeability of the vessel's
burning was not presented to the jury. The authorities relied upon
were cases of homicide and arson. But the court rejected the doctrine; it relied on and extended the Pembliton case, although there
the defendant was not engaged in committing a felony. The determinant was that: "The prisoner did not intend to set fire to
the ship - the fire was not the necessary result of the felony he
was attempting," 9 and the accused was exonerated.94 Ten years
later, the major blow to the felony-murder doctrine was given by
89

See

EDEN, PRiNcIPLES OF PENAL LAW (1771)

206-209.

90 Id. at 210.

91 I2 Cox. Cr. C. 6o7 (Crim. App. 1874).
92 13 Cox. Cr. C. 55o (Crown C. Res. Ireland i877).
93 Id. at 557.
94 Cf. People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562, igg N. W. 373 (1924), where the defendant illegally sold liquor to the deceased who froze to death after losing his way
as a result of his intoxication. The appellate court held that he could not be convicted of manslaughter "unless he commits the act carelessly and in such a manner
as manifests a reckless disregard of human life." Id. at 566, igg N. W. at 374.
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Stephen in the Serni case. 5 By holding that the actual harm must
have been foreseeable, he identified the requisite situation with
those dealt with under ordinary rules of causation, in effect repudiating the chief distinctive feature of the traditional felony-murder
doctrine.9 6
Thus that doctrine was well on its way to abandonment when the
House of Lords decided Beard's Case." There is no decision of
comparable importance in any American jurisdiction, for no court
of equal prestige has discussed the law of homicide by inebriates
in as great detail, and in the context of the felony-murder doctrine.
It will be recalled that Beard, under the influence of liquor, committed a rape on a young girl; and that, in the course of violent resistence by the girl, he seized her by the throat, causing her death.
He was convicted of murder but this was reversed by the Court of
Criminal Appeal 9 8 which substituted manslaughter on the ground
that the trial judge should have instructed, according to Meade's
Case,9 that if the defendant was so intoxicated "that he was incapable of knowing that what he was doing was dangerous, i.e.,
likely to inflict serious injury," he should be convicted of manThe conviction of murder was reinstated in the
slaughter.'
House of Lords, and their decision was based squarely on the
felony-murder doctrine, thus apparently overruling both Meade's
Case and Regina v. Sernj."' The decision, in effect, denied the
possibility that Beard might have been so drunk as not to have un95 Regina v. Sern6, 16 Cox Cr. C. 311 (N. P. 1887).
96 A similar conclusion was reached by Glgintzer in 1756. " The doer is not
liable for murder if he was not aware that a death could result from his action as
readily as the end which he had directly in view." Quoted in GRIFFON, DE L'INTENTiON EN DROI" P&NAL (1911) II. Griffon says that this was the first challenge to the
mediaeval doctrine, " Versanti in re illicita imputantur omnia quae sequuntur ex
delicto," which had been defended by St. Thomas Aquinas and Bernard of Pavia.
See id. at 7-9.
97 i4 Crim. App. 159 (H. L. 1920).
98 i4 Crim. App. iio (Crim. App. 1919).
99 [igo9] I K. B. 895. Cf. Rex v. Grindley, cited in 2 RUSSELL, CREISES AND
MISDEMEANORS (8th ed. 1857) 8, n.n.
100 [i9o9] I K. B. at 899. Justice Day went further in Regina v. Baines. See
note 17 supra.
101 This phase of Beard's Case has been adversely criticized in an excellent analysis
describing the trend away from the felony-murder doctrine, and concluding that
"The result of Beard's Case . . . nullified all the progress in improving the law of
murder which had been achieved during the past century." Turner, The Mental
Element in Crimes at Common Law (1936) 6 CAsB. L. J. 31, 64.
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derstood the dangerousness of his act. He was attempting rape and
he consummated it; therefore, held the judges, it cannot be maintained that the defendant was too intoxicated to realize that he was
seriously injuring the girl. The combination of rape and drunkenness was sufficiently persuasive to reinstate the abandoned notion
that one who intentionally commits a serious wrong is so vicious
a person that he should be liable for any consequences however unforeseeable and unsought. The assumption that a person who can
commit rape is competent to, and actually did, have an intent to
kill or seriously injure thus substituted legal presumptions for determinations of fact. This also imposed a sharp limitation on the
exculpatory doctrine 2 since under that doctrine a charge of murder could be met by disproof of "specific" intent, but it must now
be the law of England that where an inebriate has committed a
felony in the course of which he has killed someone, he will not be
permitted to disprove his intent as to the homicide; the requisite
mens rea is conclusively presumed.'
Moreover, the insistence of the Lords that insanity must invariably be sharply separated from drunkenness raised an additional
barrier to improvement of the law on criminal responsibility of inebriates. For while it is true that most courts refuse to recognize,
temporary insanity "caused by drunkenness" as a defense, they
have not drawn a hard line between the two. The characterization
of gross intoxication as insanity, common since Hale, served to
focus attention on the actual condition at the time the harm occurred and thus to preserve the possibility of a correct estimate of
culpability. In some diseases, e.g., delirium tremens, it is impossible to separate "the" disease from the intoxication. We may
speak as though the disease exists independently, and merely mani102 A more hopeful handling of the felony-murder doctrine - not in its opinion,
but in the decision reached -was indicated in People v. Koerber, 244 N. Y. 147,
155 N. E. 79 (1926).
103 In light of the decision reached it is rather surprising to find a dictum to the
effect that drunkenness which rendered a person incapable of wrongful intent should
provide a complete defense. 14 Crim. App. at 197. This suggests that though the
Lords took a harsh view where the felony-murder doctrine was applicable, they
might elsewhere give an extremely tolerant interpretation, such as that suggested by
justice Day. See note 17 supra. The dictum in Beard's Case is severely criticized
in Stroud, Constructive Murder and Drunkenness (1920) 36 L. Q. REV. 268. But
Stroud, like Austin, failed to draw certain necessary distinctions regarding essentially
different classes of inebriate wrongdoers. See pp. 1077-78 infra.
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fests itself in intoxication; but, actually, the disease includes certain conditions of which intoxication is an essential element.
Hence to insist that disease entirely excludes intoxication can only
strengthen the prevailing bias against certain diseased persons. It
is thus apparent that Beard's Case helps to perpetuate the rationalistic psychology on "intention" which continues to be characteristic of Anglo-American decisions on crimes by inebriates, despite
the obvious fact that drunkenness lifts the bars of inhibition and
stimulates the flood of instinctual drives.104
The policy of justifying punishment for a harm by reliance on
an earlier "wrong" has been even more strongly and fallaciously
implemented by the misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrine, indeed,
by the harshest phase of that doctrine which includes reliance on
intended acts that, though immoral, are not even misdemeanors."0 5
That the accused "voluntarily" became intoxicated, even if that
is assumed to describe his conduct accurately, does not provide an
ethical defense for the imposition of the severe sanctions that are
typically imposed. Certainly it is pushing ethics to a formalistic
extreme, as Aristotle was apparently willing to do when he approved of double penalization of intoxicated offenders,'0 0 to hold
for the sole reason that an individual drank intoxicating liquor,
that he should be responsible for whatever harm he subsequently
does while grossly inebriated. Even if the matter is put in terms
that deprecate the taking of intoxicating liquor in the smallest
quantity, the same general evaluation must obtain because the significance of the volition manifested in the drinking cannot be assessed apart from the knowledge that accompanied it. Only if
drinking usually led to intoxication, and intoxication were normally followed by the commission of serious harms, could the prevailing dogma be upheld. But the facts are palpably otherwise.
The modern tendency has been to oppose policy-formation such as
that embodied in or extended from the felony-murder doctrine. It
has insisted on a decent regard for the facts and on sanctions that
represent fair evaluations of these facts and not of the supposed
character of the offender. Most emphatically the progressive
104 See Davis, Drunkenness and the Criminal Law (941) s J. CaR. L. (London) 66, x69; Lewis, PersonalityFactorsin Alcoholic Addiction (1940) z Q. J. STU.
ALc. 21, 32-33.
105 Regina v. Prince, T3 Cox Cr. C. 138 (Crim. App. 1875).
106 NIca0mAcBEN ETmcs bk. HI, c. 5.
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tendency has been to repudiate the imposition of severe penalties
where bare chance results in an unsought harm. In the light of
this criticism, it should occasion little wonder that the logic of the
felony-murder,.misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrine as well as that
of criminal negligence obscures analysis of the penal responsibility
of inebriates, and retards the discovery of sound policy.
FINDINGS OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ON ALCOHOLISm

A principal objective of the analysis of the exculpatory doctrine
and its application has been to remove certain technical supports
of the law on the criminal responsibility of inebriates, which, so
long as they are assumed to be valid, must retard solution of the
problem. Available empirical knowledge now leads to a direct
criticism of the dominating attitudes and the immediately relevant
legal doctrines. It is plain that the lack of official information concerning alcoholism and the invalidity of current evaluations of
conduct and harms committed by inebriates are important determinants of the case-law. In stressing the discoveries of twentieth
century research on alcoholism, one must avoid the extravagant
claim that little was known about intoxication in past times. In
fact, careful observers noted its typical characteristics very precisely many hundreds of years ago. Seneca's Epistle on Drunkenness abounds in shrewd observations that can hardly be improved."0 7 And skipping centuries of like sophistication, even
experts cannot improve on Kant's definition of drunkenness as
"the unnatural state of inability to organize sense impressions according to the laws of experience "

08

and Dr. Kerr's book," 9 origi-

nally published in i888, may still be read with much profit. But
,there has been great progress during the past quarter century which
may fairly be said to mark the emergence of sustained scientific research on the problems of alcoholism. 'his research is chiefly the
result of epochal advances in psychiatry and of the application of
the laboratory phases of medicine to this field. That the available
knowledge is still inadequate is evident from the diversities of
opinion regarding such primary problems as the meaning of
See Note (i943) 3 Q. J. STu. ATc. 302, 303.
See Note (i94i) I Q. J. STU. Awc. 777.
309 INEBRIETY OR NARcoMAiA (3d ed. 1894).
Cf. Crothers, The Scientific Study
of Inebriate Criminals,in THE MEDICAL JUISPRUDENCE OF INEBRIETY (I888) 57.
107

108
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"drunkenness,""' and from the lack of knowledge concerning
other important problems, such as statistics on the incidence of
intoxication in criminal behavior"'
But on many questions of the utmost importance for the law of
criminal responsibility there is unanimity of expert opinion concerning which courts seem quite unaware. The disparity between
judicial and available knowledge is indicated by the need to point
out that one of the commonest of expert agreements is that "alcoholic addiction" (dipsomania) is a disease. " It cannot be disputed," writes a recognized specialist, "that some people find it
impossible to refrain from alcohol in spite of repeated experience
which should prove to them that its use always leads to very unpleasant situations." 12 The disease is no more difficult to diagnose
than many others that are commonly recognized, and it is definitely
distinguishable from habitual intoxication. 3 Yet the common
attitude of the courts continues to be an unvarying rigorous interpretation of "voluntary" intoxication. Delirium tremens has also
long been clearly recognized as a definite disease in medical classifications everywhere.114 In this particular instance, many courts
have shown a willingness to accept the known facts." 5 But even
here, we find courts still skeptical, some of them thinking the disease can be simulated, others still insisting that it is nothing more
than the ordinary result of extreme intoxication." 6 Equally unfounded is the rule that temporary insanity brought on by intoxi110 See Hall, Drunkenness as a Criminal Offense (194)

I

Q. J.

STu. Aic. 751,

754-56, reprinted in (194i) 32 J. CRim. L. 297.
111 Kinberg, Alcohol and Criminality (1914) 5 J. CRim. L. 569.

112 He continues: "These unfortunate persons know that if they yield to the
temptation of the first drink, all power of inhibition is lost. They know that they
will go on and on with a spree of intoxication ending only when the flesh rebels.
Such people drink in spite of losing their standing in society, their ability to hold
positions and their physical health. The suffering of dependents is no deterrent.
During periods of sobriety they grieve and repent but in a short time they are off on
another debauch." Darling, Inebriety: A Classification (1942) 2 Q. 3. STu. ALC.
077, 678.
113 For a diagnosis of the dipsomaniac and the differences between him and the
habitual drinker, see KyANF-EBING, TEXT BooK OF INsANrrY (Chaddock trans.
1904) 434-36; HAGGARD AND JELLINEK, ALcOHoL EXPLORED (1942) 156-57.
114 See Wortis, Delirium Tremens (1940) 1 Q. 3. STU. Aic. 251.
115 For a collection of cases, see Note (1921) 12 A. L. R. 895-900.
116 Stephen's farsighted opinion in Regina v. Davis (14 Cox. Cr. C. 563 (N. P.
1881)) should have effected a more enlightened judicial result long ago. See I
WHARTON AND STILLES, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE (3d ed. 1873) 209.
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cation is no defense. The avowed ground is that insanity which is
not "permanent " in the sense of continuing beyond the intoxication is not a true mental disease, but again the courts run definitely
counter to generally held expert opinion."
The dogma that the
defendant " voluntarily" became intoxicated ...
is least persuasive
here. For such adjudication is not only accompanied by complete
indifference to the symptoms of recognized disease, it also presupposes awareness by the defendant that he is subject to attacks of
temporary insanity, i.e., that he has correctly diagnosed his illness,
and that though diseased he is able to act precisely as a healthy
person."' In many of these cases the symptoms of psychopathic
states are unmistakable. There is a widely-held expert opinion,
moreover, that excessive drinking is itself frequently symptomatic
of serious mental disease.'
Dipsomania and delirium tremens are
merely two of the more commonly known mental diseases which
involve inebriety in some form. There are various others, equally
recognizable, and rather uniformly diagnosed.' 2 ' It is known,
117 Cf. "One of the popular conceptions of insanity is that the condition usually
lasts for a considerable time and cannot be transient. This is not the case, and some
forms of insanity, notably those associated with acute infections, may be of very
short duration." Davis, Drunkenness and the Criminal Law (1941) 5 J. Csm. L.
(London) i66, 181.
118 Cf. "If insanity follows immediately upon the drunken state, the mere
fact that it assumes the form of delirium trenens rather than some other form can
make no difference in principle and should not excuse. Such a result seems to violate neither logic nor sound policy. The decisive question should simply be whether
in a given case the temporary frenzy can fairly be said to be voluntary." Book Review (19o2) 15 HARv. L. REV. 755, 755-56.
119 Kinberg shows that various abnormalities which are entirely controlled during
sobriety are manifested in drunkenness, e.g., homosexual acts, the setting of fires
"without ever having shown in a state of sobriety any pyromanic tendencies."
Kinberg, Alcohol and Criminality (1914) 5 J. CRm. L. 569, 573. He cites various
other harms committed by persons in a drunken state who never did any of them
while sober. Ibid. These manifestations are sometimes followed by complete amnesia as to the conduct during the drunken condition.
120 ". . . there is a great agreement among present-day psychiatrists on the
question of alcohol addiction as symptomatic of many psychoses rather than as their
primary cause." Bowman and Jellinek, Alcoholic Mental Disorders (i94i) 2 Q. J.

STu. ALC. 312, 315.

"Alcohol sometimes precipitates mental disorders, in other instances its use
modifies the picture and course of mental disorder and in still other'cases it is merely
one of the symptoms." Lewis, Psychiatric Resultants of Alcoholism: Alcoholism
and Mental Disease (1941) 2 Q. J. STu. Atc. 293, 295.
121 For classification and description, see Blair, Alcoholism-A Medico-Legal
Survey (194) 9 MEDIcO-LEGAL & CEimNOL. REV. 21r, 215-IS; Bowman and Jel-
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also, that many inebriates who commit crimes are so impaired
physically and psychically as to be only partially responsible for
their misconduct.'2 2 They do not exhibit well-marked psychoses,

but they are definitely abnormal, hence the indication here is
neither complete exculpation nor normal capacity.123 These generalizations, taken from recent researches on alcoholism, could be
considerably amplified. They indicate the need for thorough reexamination of the knowledge that is current in official circles and
of the consequent evaluations of inebriate harms. The unfortunate fact is that the intoxication is an irritating stimulus to righteous judges; it is easier to vent moral disapproval than to probe the
scientific literature.
In its most extreme form, a criticism of the prevailing rules demands complete exculpation of all inebriates. It is therefore

equally important to emphasize that such sweeping claims are not
supported by expert opinion. On the contrary such opinion is, of
course, discriminating in terms of the great diversity in personality
types and etiology involved.' 24 The crux of the matter, as stated
by distinguished experts in this field, is that "the progress of . . .
research . . . has been impeded by two misconceptions: the first
that all habitual excessive drinking is a disease, and the second,
linek, Alcoholic Mental Disorders (1941) 2 Q. J. STU. ALe. 312, 314, 315; Lewis,
PsychiatricResultants of Alcoholism: Alcoholism and Mental Disease (94z) 2 Q. J.
STU. AL . 293. The Quarterly Journalof Studies on Alcohol is an invaluable source

of information on the entire problem.
22 See Lewis, Personality Factors in Alcoholic Addiction (1940) 1 Q.

3. Sru.

ALC. 21, 29.

123 There is a serious need, in dealing with these problems,'for a vocabulary that
correctly denotes the well-recognizable states of intoxication and the various mental
diseases. This demand is adequately met by a simple statement of terms and definitions that reflects the best contemporary research in this country. See HAGGARD AND
JELLINEK, ALCOHOL ExPoRED (1942)

8-i6.

The authors classify inebriates as

" normal excessive drinkers, symptomatic drinkers, stupid drinkers, and addicts."
Id. at 13. (Italics in original.) In symptomatic drinkers, "drinking is a symptom
of their psychotic state." Id. at 14. Stupid drinkers are the feeble-minded. The
most confused term is "chronic alcoholic." " Chronic alcoholism is not the habitual
drinking of large amounts of alcohol but definite disease conditions resulting from
such habits ....

an addict is not necessarily a chronic alcoholic ....

An alcohol

addict is a person with an 'uncontrollable craving for alcohol. The outstanding criterion is the inability to break with the habit.'" Id. at Y5.
124 See Jellinek and Jolliffe, Effects of Alcohol on the Individual: Review of the
Literature of r939 (1940) i Q. J. Sxu. ALe. iio, 135; cf. HAGGARD AND JELLflMEK,
ALCOHOL ExvLoRED (1942).
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that it is the same disease."

12"
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And " it must be stressed that mere

drunkenness is not regarded in the scientific literature as evidence
of either addiction or chronic alcoholism." 126 The experts emphasize the futility of generalizing about all inebriates "as if the term
denoted a well-defined individual." 1 27 They believe that about
"50.0 per cent of inebriates have definite nervous and mental abnormalities," but that " 30.0 per cent of the inebriates show no
abnormalities at all. .

.

.The true addicts constitute at present

the smallest group of inebriates." 128 " Delirium tremens is a mental disorder of brief duration which occurs only in some 4.0 per
cent of heavy drinkers." 129 " There are many excessive drinkers
who by all appearances have normal personalities." 1' These
findings are significant in regard to the penal responsibility of
inebriates.' 2 ' They support the thesis that sound criticism does
not require wholesale repudiation of existing law, especially of the
basic principles of culpability. On the contrary, " false sentimentality should not be permitted to enter into the situation. It must
be recognized that many inebriates are simply criminals who drink
excessively, not victims of drink driven to crime, and such individuals are properly the wards of penal institutions." 112 The
avenue to reform is marked out by the juncture of the above analysis of the defects in the existing rules and knowledge of the relevant
facts.
125 Jellinek and Jolliffe, Effects of Alcohol on the Individual: Review of the
Literature of z939 (1940) 1 Q. J. STu. Ac.1iO, 143.
126 Bowman and Jellinek, Alcohol Addiction and Its Treatment (1941) 2 Q. J.

STu. ALc. 98, Ioo-ioi; Cf. KERR, INEBRIETY OR NARCOmaANIA ( 3 d ed. 1894) 12-14.
127 HAGGARD AND JELINEK, ALcOHOL EXPLORED (1942) 153.
128 Id. at 151, I57.
129 Id. at 230.
120

Id. at 163-64.

131 Banay, Alcoholism and Crime (1942) 2

Q. 3.

STU. AC. 686, controverts the

general impression that the majority of crimes are caused by drunkenness. Commenting on Dr. Banay's findings, Drs. Jellnek and Haggard say: "This study differs
from others in that the prisoners are classified according to the role of inebriety in
their crimes. It appears from Dr. Banay's analysis that the usual estimate of crimes
caused by inebriety given as 6o.o per cent, must be lowered to 25.0 per cent. This
is, however, still a formidable proportion."
P1LORED (1942) 263.

HAGGARD AND JELLINEK, ALcoHoL Ex-

132 Id. at 273. See East, Alcoholism and Crime in Relation to Afanic-Depressive Disorder(1936) 230 LA.CET i6i, 163. But cf. Kinberg, Alcohol and Criminality
(194) 5 J. Cim. L. 569, 584, 587-88.
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PROPOSED LEGAL REFORMS

In considering the reform of the law on the penal responsibility
of inebriates, we must bear in mind that the wrong charged is a
harm committed during gross intoxication. The actor, while
sober, had no intention to harm anyone, and, when he did commit
a harm, he did not realize the dangerousness of his conduct and
was unable to restrain his impulses. Certain astute critics, meritoriously influenced by these facts, have argued that logical solution requires penalization for the voluntary intoxication and complete exculpation for the harm done while intoxicated. 3 ' But
voluntary intoxication in itself was, with rare exception, no crime at
all at common law, and under modern statutes the penalties for the
accompanying " disorderly conduct" are so small as to be entirely
nugatory. Their indiscriminate imposition on ordinary drunken
conduct and on such drunkenness followed by serious harm would
seem socially incongruous, however logical. But there is an element of validity in this view, which suggests that under certain
conditions, serious penalties should be attached to voluntary intoxication 3 and that this could be done consistently with traditional principles of culpability.
A more persuasive theory in support of substantial punitive
sanctions for harms by inebriates was put forth by Austin, who,
expressing the common attitude toward drunkenness in terms of
legally significant principle, argued that a person who voluntarily
became intoxicated acted recklessly in so doing since he deliberately induced a state of dangerousness in himself, in disregard of
public safety.'35 Austin, however, took no cognizance of facts
which have become of paramount importance, e.g., that the inebriate might be a habitual drunkard or an alcoholic addict. Nor did
Austin or Stroud, who followed him, 3 distinguish these cases from
that of an inexperienced acute drunkard who had no foreknowledge
of his probable conduct when intoxicated. Hence the present need
133 ,, . . the true effect of presuming knowledge or intention, in spite of the
facts, is to make drunkenness itself an offense, which is punishable with a degree of
punishment varying with the consequences of the act done." MARKBY, ELEMENTS
or TnE LAW (6th ed. 19o5) 363; cf. x LE SELLYmE, TRArT DE LA CRaINALITL, DE LA
PLNALITL ET DE LA RESPONSABILITL (1874) 140.
134 Analogous crimes are "reckless driving," "possession of burglar's tools," etc.
135 See AusnN, LEcTuREs ON JURISPRUDENCE (1879) 512-13.
138 See Smoum, Mqs RFA (1914) IIS.
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is to supplement the above theory in light of facts and knowledge
now available concerning alcoholism. The initial step in this direction is a classification of inebriates and fact-situations that is both
defensible empirically and also relevant to the problems of penal
responsibility. On these criteria, inebriates who commit harms
are (i) normal or diseased, "normal" including not only_ the
inexperienced acute drunkard but also, at the other extreme of this
category, the habitual drunkard; and (2) they are intoxicated in
various degrees when they commit the harms charged against
them.
The latter problem can be disposed of quite briefly. We must,
for the present purpose, eliminate the two extremes, i.e., slight intoxication, which ordinarily would have only the effect of mitigation, and intoxication so gross as to induce complete loss of control
of elementary physical movements or even stupor, in which condition motor activity of any kind is simply impossible. In the
cases relevant to the problem, the defendant is in a state of intoxication between these extremes. What we find here is not incapacity to perform simple acts or such a failure of the intelligence as to
exclude purposive conduct,' but rather such a blunting of ethical
sensitiveness as to destroy the understanding of the moral quality
of the act, combined with a drastic lapse of inhibition. All of this
closely resembles "insanity " of both recognized varieties - in3 s
ability to distinguish right from wrong and irresistible impulse.1
Within the limits of the typical situation, certain distinctions
must be drawn between the two groups of normal offenders, i.e.,
between those who had no previous experience with intoxication
that induced a dangerous state, and those with such experience.
As regards the inexperienced inebriate, it is submitted that on
principle he can not be held criminally liable simply because his
indulgence was voluntary. For such persons, the gross drunkenness at the time the harm was committed excludes the required
conditions of culpability entirely. There can be no valid reference
137 See East, Murder, From the Point of Vew of the Psychiatrist (1935) 3
MEDICO-LEGAL & CRxmmqoL. REV.61, 78.

138 "Writing in s877, Sir Arthur Mitchell put the matter thus: 'It should be at
once understood that alcoholic intoxication, i.e. ordinary drunkenness, is really a
state of insanity." Quoted in Christie, Intoxication in Relation to Criminal Responsibility (1920) ScoTs L. T. NEws 75, So. "' In reality the acute alcoholic intoxication is a poisoning of the brain and. can be placed side by side with the severest
mental disturbances which are known to us.' (Meggendorfer)." Bowman and Jellinek, Alcoholic Mental Disorders (1941) 2 Q. J. STrU. AiC. 312, 319.
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back to the drinking, which though "voluntary " was quite innocent. Complete exculpation is not only just in such cases, but it is
a necessary implication of the only rational basis of penal liability
available (that posited on moral culpability). Complete exculpation in such cases might shock public opinion and traditional judicial attitudes concerning drunkenness. But aside from principles
that must on rational grounds challenge even deeply rooted mores,
there are certain practical considerations that should effect the
feasibility of the above reform. Thus there is the widely-held expert opinion that serious harms are very rarely committed by
normal inexperienced inebriates." 9 The cases support this view,
exhibiting addiction or long histories of repeated dangerous intoxication. In addition, nonpunitive treatment of the inexperienced
normal inebriate wrongdoer may be indicated and should be available.1"'
The experienced, normal inebriate, described in legally relevant
terms, ranges from persons who at least once previously to the
harm in issue have been intoxicated and acted dangerously in that
condition to those persons whose behavior exhibits such a regular pattern of such occurrences as to be" habitual." It is the combination of experience of prior intoxication and of dangerousness
139 "The acute alcoholic intoxication is different in persons who are chronic alcoholics than in those who are intoxicated for the first time. It seems that in the
chronic alcoholic the acute intoxication brings forward more primitive material."
Schilder, The Psychogenesis of Alcoholism (i941) 2 Q. J. STU. ALc. 277, 290.
140 Another situation, rarely met, but relevant to the above class of inebriates

and theoretically interesting, concerns deliberate intoxication in order to facilitate
desired criminal behavior. It has been frequently asserted and rarely challenged
that if a person intending to commit a crime -becomes intoxicated to increase his
pluck, as Austin put it, his intoxication should be an aggravation. But this is questionable. Ex hypothesi, the offense was committed under gross intoxication and on
that score is less culpable than the like conduct by a sober person. Next, if reference is back to the intoxication and its malevolent purpose during sobriety, it must
be conceded also that a person who requires intoxication to steel his courage is less
vicious than one who can proceed deliberately to the commission of the crime without
such stimulation. There is, in addition, a very nice question of fact that underlies
much of the dialectics, can a grossly intoxicated person remember his earlier intention
to commit a crime, retain that purpose during the course of his gross intoxication and
act accordingly. It is generally assumed that this is possible, and aggravation of
the penalty beyond that imposed on sober persons for the like harm is posited
thereon. For the reason suggested above, however, the relevant question is whether
mitigation or the usual penalty (in disregard of the intoxication) should be applied.
Other difficult problems that can be raised depend on whether the harm committed
under gross intoxication was caused by the earlier decision during sobriety or whether
the two were merely coincidental.
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while in that condition that must have been in the mind of the inebriate wrongdoer when he was sober and indulged his desire that
is legally significant. For this group, it is apparent that the drinking itself was a serious matter; indeed, as suggested, it should itself
be made criminal and punished much more severely than the" disorderly conduct" associated with ordinary intoxication.141 As
regards distinctions drawn between the inexperienced and the
habitual drunkard, some writers 142 have posed this problem: the
habitual drunkard knows the effect of alcohol on him, whereas
the inexperienced drinker lacks such knowledge. This factor signifies the culpability of the habitual inebriate. On the other hand,
he is assailed by much greater temptation, his self-control is impaired. This implies lack of culpability. The dilemma thus raised
rests on two fallacies: it confuses the habitual drunkard (who is
normal) with the addict (who is diseased); and it assumes that
because the drinking was voluntary, the intoxication of the uninitiated is culpable, indeed that it is more so than that of the habitual
drunkard. These views are untenable. So long as the habitual
drunkard is "normal," he, while sober, has a "sufficient " degree
of understanding of the dangerousness of his indulgence and also
of self-control to justify his being held responsible. 43
141 A rather serious question concerning the proposed solution is raised by the
fact that in some instances the conduct during intoxication is completely forgotten
on the return of sobriety. But such complete amnesia is rare. In addition, information regarding his behaviour during his intoxication is almost invariably conveyed.
And it is usually believed since it is not solely hearsay, there is some awareness of
the intoxication and some impression is made by the behaviour. But there may be
exceptions and they will call for considerable mitigation.
142 See, e.g., TARDE, PENAL PHILOSOPHY (Howell trans. 1912) 190-91.
143 To facilitate a more complete evaluation of these proposals, one would want
to consider in this context "legal provocation" and recklessness resulting in homicide. The latter conduct is similar to that of the experienced inebriate; both are
culpable because of the awareness of exposing others to increased danger. But the
experienced inebriate is the less culpable because of his impaired capacity to control
his indulgence. "Legal provocation" raises more serious difficulties chiefly because of the imposition of the "objective" test as regards both the initial loss of
control and concerning "cooling-time." To state the bare conclusions, the "objective" test is ethically indefensible, but if the "subjective" test were applied manslaughter would be justifiable. Since all normal persons do not kill under the given
circumstances, the inference is that a substantial, though diminished, ability to control is actually available to normal persons. But the culpability for homicide under
"legal provocation" would seem to be less than either that of the experienced inebriate or the sober reckless person since there was no fault whatever in creating the
situation that produced the emotion and loss of control. Thus, of the four types
of cases discussed: a homicide caused by recklessness, unaffected by intoxication, is
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But careful study of the case-histories of such offenders, who
constitute a majority of the inebriate perpetrators of serious
harms, indicates plainly that these persons are defective, though
remaining within the limits of normality. Hence they are only
"partially responsible," and should be subjected to both punitive
and nonpunitive sanctions. A substantial medical literature has
developed the idea of "partial responsibility," and the question
merits* examination as regards treatment of inebriate offenders.
The relevant thesis is that " normal" and "incompetent" represent merely extremes. There is an intermediate zone of persons
who are "weak " physically and psychically, i.e., there is an unbroken continuum from "normal" to "incompetent," composed
of imperceptible gradations that can be separated only arbitrarily.
Hence the legal classification is unsound - so concludes the criticism. Certainly to a nonlegal mind, it must seem highly probable
that there are countless persons whose classification within either
extreme category does violence to the facts. Hence the claim that
there should be a third legally recognized category, "the semiresponsible," has been vigorously asserted.' 44 The fallacy of such
proposals, however, arises from a failure to grasp the nature of law
and the purposes and limitations of legal control. Legal adjudication and the inexorable logic of its method, implied in the issue
whether a person does or does not fall within the reach of the prescriptions, require a determination that the defendant is responsible or that he is not responsible. There is no other alternative.
Hence, interpreted not merely as a scientific category, but also as a
legally significant one, "semi-responsible " must imply two things:
responsibility, and a lesser degree of responsibility. In short, it
represents no new category; it signifies simply that one of the
present legal categories (" normal" or " responsible ") is divisible
into degrees, ranging from an ideal of maximum capacity to that
least degree of capacity which satisfies the accepted, minimum
standard of "normality." The European codes typically include
"partial responsibility" as a distinctive category; we do not, believing that the problem is met by exercise of discretionary powers.
most culpable; that caused by an experienced (" normal ") inebriate is next cul-

pable; that caused by a person, actually provoked by a situation not brought on by
himself, is least culpable of the three; and that caused by an inexperienced gross
inebriate is not culpable at all.
144 See GRAssET, THE SFMI-INSANE AND THE SEMI-RESPONSIBLE (Jelliffe trans.
19o7).
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A surer indication that other legal systems are farther advanced
than ours as regards treatment of harms by inebriates is their frequent provision for hospitalization 4 5 in addition to punitive sanctions. Such " measures of safety" raise delicate problems. It is
the authorities who determine what are nonpunitive measures and recent European history should shed the last illusion regarding
the possibility of abuse. The lesson clearly demands a rigorous insistence on attention to the facts, sanctions consistent with democratic values, and a decent regard for the meanings of words. As
to the commission of serious harms by diseased persons who are,
therefore, properly classified as " dangerous," the basic need is
recognition of the principle that " dangerousness," in this context,
posits lack of responsibility. Nor can " dangerousness" be permitted to mean suspicion or even probability of criminal behavior,
even though predicted by recognized experts. Except for violations
of probation and parole, where the term may be properly given a
more extensive meaning, " dangerousness" must be limited to determinations following, and based on, actual behavior violative of
specific prescriptions in the criminal law. It is the conjunction of
such behavior with incapacity that justifies even nonpunitive treatment. On the other hand, it must be recognizedthat it is highly
dubious, even from a purely theoretical viewpoint, whether any
interference with normal living can ever be completely nonpunitive. Perhaps all that can be done is to sensitize the authorities to
a keen awareness of their duties in such cases, and to encourage
release from confinement on any fair showing that a cure has been
effected.
CONCLUSION

The exculpatory doctrine represented a sound insight and the
beginning of a valid policy on the penal responsibility of inebriates.
But its formulation in terms of the negation of " specific intent"
was highly unfortunate. The problem cannot be solved by ignoring the facts or by fiction. The principal facts that must be taken
account of in the formulation of the legal rules concern (a) the
lack of control and ethical understanding at the time the harm
was committed and (b) circumstances during sobriety which sig34 See 6i & 62 Vim., c. 6o, § i (1898); POLISH PENAL CODE OF 1932 (Lemkin
trans. 1939) C. 12, art. 82 ; Swiss PENAL CODE art. 44.
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nify that drinking of intoxicating liquor by certain types of persons
is reckless misconduct.
The above analysis suggests the following specific changes in
the law on the penal responsibility of inebriates: i) the general
rule concerning "voluntary drunkenness" should be limited to
normal experienced inebriates; 2) the cumbersome indirections
resulting from an exculpatory doctrine, irrelevantly phrased in
terms negating " specific intent," should be entirely eliminated; 3)
the invocation of unsound analogies, and especially the continued
bar to systematization of the criminal law that is raised by the
felony-murder, misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrine and by negligence, as bases for penal liability, should be terminated; 4) the
majority rule (murder in the second degree) should be changed to
manslaughter.
The rules should be expressed, not in terms of lack of "intent"
but in terms of "lack of understanding of the ethical quality of the
act and of ability to control" (thus building on Meade's Case).
It is a corollary of the above that complete exculpation in many
cases of robbery, larceny, etc. is not warranted.1 46 Some courts
have taken this position, refusing to apply the exculpatory doctrine
on the ground that a person who took another's property should
not be permitted to plead that he did not intend to do so, i.e., by
giving" intent" its correct meaning, and thus nullifying the exculpatory dodtrine in these cases. Other courts, which do apply the
exculpatory doctrine fully to these offenses, do so only by a strained
interpretation of "intent" or by encouraging the jury to acquit.
But if it is fair to hold certain experienced inebriates guilty of manslaughter by relation back to their indulgence, then it is impossible
to defend complete exculpation in cases of larceny and robbery,
since the same conditions exist. But here too the claim for mitigation should be heard.'
In all cases of harms by inebriates there
is clear need for open-mindedness concerning the presence of a diseased condition, operative either at the time of indulgence or when
the harm was committed or at both times. The courts should recognize that intoxication is frequently a symptom of a mental disorder and should give an unbiased hearing to such pleas.
146 The typical situation here is the experienced drunkard with a past history
of taking other persons' property while intoxicated.
147 Barbier quotes the result of researches to the effect that lesser degrees of intoxication are found in crimes against property. See BARBIER, LE D-rrT ALCOOLIQuE

(930)

2X-22.
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In summary:
i. The scientific literature on alcoholism does not indicate that

traditional principles of culpability, stated in terms of voluntary
misconduct and punishment, are invalid, but suggests the need for
reinterpretation, in the light of the presently available knowledge,
of the meanings of those principles when they are applied to harms
committed during gross intoxication.
2. The general principle of penal responsibility requires that
normal persons who intentionally or recklessly commit harms forbidden by penal law should be punished. But since drinking is not
usually followed by intoxication, and intoxication does not usually
lead to the commission of such harms, it follows that normal persons who commit harms while grossly intoxicated, should not be
punished unless, at the time of sobriety and the voluntary drinking, they had such prior experience as to anticipate their intoxication and that they would become dangerous in that condition.
This would require a major change in the existing rules. But, since
it is rare for normal persons, without prior experience of dangerousness while intoxicated, to commit harms, their complete exculpation, warranted on principle, should evoke no misgivings. Moreover, this change in law is essential to a correct formulation of all
the rules concerning the penal responsibility of inebriates. In addition, the need for treatment, perhaps hospitalization, may be
clearly indicated.
3. Voluntary intoxication is not an excuse if the defendant is a
normal person whose previous experience should have forewarned
him that he will probably become intoxicated if he drinks, and that
he is dangerous when intoxicated.' 48 Such a person acts recklessly
when he drinks liquor, and if he kills a human being, while grossly
intoxicated, he is guilty of manslaughter. The crime cannot be
murder in any degree because at no time in the sequence of events
from the indulgence to the killing was there an intention to kill or
seriously injure by a sober, normal person. There is at least partial responsibility here, and both punishment for manslaughter and
hospitalization are warranted.
Jerome Hall.
INDIANA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW.

148 This conclusion is supported by many writers. See, e.g., i BENTHAM, WORRS
(Bowring ed. 1843) 79; GILSON, MoRAL VALUES AND THE MORAL L=VE (Ward trans.
1931) 293-94; PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MoRAL AND POLITICAL PHO.SOPHY (1817)
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